Abstract. We investigate mean field games from the point of view of a large number of indistinguishable players which eventually converges to infinity. The players are weakly coupled via their empirical measure. The dynamics of the individual players is governed by pure jump type propagators over a finite space. Investigations are conducted in the framework of non-linear Markov processes. We show that the individual optimal strategy results from a consistent coupling of an optimal control problem with a forward non-autonomous dynamics. In the limit as the number N of players goes to infinity this leads to a jump-type analog of the well-known non-linear McKean-Vlasov dynamics. The case where one player has an individual preference different from the ones of the remaining players is also covered. The two results combined reveal a 1 N -Nash Equilibrium for the approximating system of N players.
Introduction
Mean field game theory is a type of dynamic Game theory where the agents are coupled with each other by their individual dynamics and their empirical mean. The objective of each agent, given in terms of the so called cost function, does not only depend on her own preference and decision but also on the decisions of the other players. All in all it is a mathematical tool to describe a control problem with a large number N of agents where the impact of the individual decisions of the other agents is becoming extremely weak compared to the overall impact as N increases to infinity. The limiting model emerges from the fact that each agent constructs her strategy from her own state and from the state of the empirical mean of an infinite number of co-agents of hers and results in a decoupled dynamics and objective which depend on the law of her dynamics.
The investigations in this work are carried out in the framework of non-linear Markovian propagators, respectively time inhomogeneous nonlinear Feller processes, which was developed by Vassili Kolokoltsov [18] [19] . We focus on propagators related to processes of pure jump type with finite intensity measure on a finite set X = {1, . . . , k}, k ∈ IN . The elements of this set can be identified with the possible decisions of the players, respectively with the (financial) positions in the financial instruments of a finite market. Our starting point of the so called closed-loop construction including an optimal control is the following forward Kolmogorov equation written in the weak form: Here we introduce the notation f i ′ in order to describe that A i acts on the component x i ∈ X only. In fact f i ′ (x i ) = f x ′ i (x i ) where x ′ i ∈ X |x|−1 is derived by removing the variable corresponding to the i th agent from x. The length of the vectors describing the number of players is denoted by |x|.
Hypothesis A
We assume ν i (s, j, ρ, u) to be linear in the parameter u = u s and postulate ν i (s, j, ρ) to be a bounded kernel in all parameters uniformly in s, 0 ≤ t < s ≤ T , and vanishing for i = j. The choice of the space X means that the integral is a sum. The parameters of the generator A are subject to the assumptions that the control law u ∈ U satisfies u s ∈ U with bounded convex set U having a smooth boundary, and that ρ is a Lipschitz continuous measure valued function on [0, T ] such that for all s ∈ [t, T ] we have ρ s ∈ P δ (X), the linear hull of Dirac probability measures. The natural domain of the operator D(A[s, ρ s , u s ]) ⊂ C 0 (X) and C 0 (X) is the set of continuous functions vanishing at infinity on the discrete spaceX which will be restricted according to technical constraints.
For the sake of completeness we add that P δ (X) ⊂ M(X), with M(X) being the set of finite measures on X. An analogous statement holds when replacing X byX. We also introduce the set of continuous measure valued functions C([0, T ], M(X)), respectively, C µ = {ρ ∈ C([0, T ], M(X)) | ρ 0 = µ} for later purposes. We mention that there exists an injection fromX into IN , which rises the question why we are using the notion C(X) of continuous functions. In fact, it seems advantageous at this stage to keep the analogy to jump processes on continuous spaces. Later we shall identify C(X) and IR k . We also mention that M(X) is isomorphic to IR k . The sensitivity analysis is carried out on an open neighborhood M ⊂ IR k of the origin.
As mentioned above the construction involves a mean-field type limit consistent with a given optimal control problem. This is a particular example of measure valued limits from the theory of interacting particle systems. A key role within the toolbox of this theory plays the injection from the equivalence class SX of vectors x ∈X, which are identical up to a permutation of players, into the set of point measures on X, defined by
More precisely, for arbitrary N ∈ IN the mapping constitutes a bijection between SX N and the subset P 
N , see e.g. [7] , [16] . Since all agents are assumed to be subject to the same equation, the generator A being of special form (1.2), one investigates the dynamics for one representative of N agents given by the time inhomogeneous Markov process
As the number N of agents tends to infinity the dynamics of the representative player depends on her own state and distribution only. Similar results from mathematical physics exist and physicists phrase this phenomenon: "the individual dynamics in the mean field model separate as N → ∞". By assumption the objective for each of the N players is to find the value function
.e. to maximize her expected payoff over a suitable class of admissible control processes u = {u(s,
Here the cost function J : [0, T ]× X× P N δ (X)× U → IR and the terminal cost function V T : X× P N δ (X) → IR, as well as the final time T are given. With a particular choise we insure that the cost function is concave.
An explicit expression for the value function can be derived by dynamic programming as solution of the HJB equation (4.4) . For admissible control processes the HJB equation is well posed and the resulting optimal feedback control functionû N is unique for given start value x ∈ X and given ρ. The so-called kinetic equation which leads to the nonlinear Markov process in the sense of V. Kolokoltsov with control law u is derived by making an Ansatz motivated by the weak form of the one player evolution with an intrinsic choice of the parameter ρ in the generator:
for arbitrary g ∈ C(X) and arbitrary finite measures µ s ∈ M(X) which are differentiable in s ∈ [0, T ]. To this end the corresponding differential equation for the adjoint operator and the Koopman propagator to the nonlinear flow given by the solution are investigated. The construction exhibits the order of convergence to be 1 N . The associated control problem reveals an optimal feedback control u. Finally MFG consistency is said to hold if the fixed measure valued function ρ in the objective function can be replaced by the empirical measures
of the underlying process while well-posedness of the optimal control problem and uniqueness of the optimal control parameter are conserved -as a result of what could be called a closed loop construction. This is realized by a fix point argument which establishes the 1 N -Nash equilibrium. We conclude the introduction with an overview of how the paper is organized. In Section 2 the dynamics of the game is introduced, in particular the Markovian propagator or time inhomogeneous semi group and the continuous in time Markov chain for one representative player. In Section 3 the limiting dynamics is set up and the generator of the corresponding Koopman propagator is explicitly derived. The sensitivity analysis for the two associated control problems is discussed in Section 4. In the subsequent Section 5 the limit when the number of players tends to infinity is investigated. Bounds for the approximation error are derived for the dynamics as well as for the value functions. In the concluding section the 1 N -Nash equilibrium is established.
Pure Jump Markov Processes
In the entire section let us assume that the generator A decomposes as given in (1.2). Hence we consider a single player i. In order to simplify notations we even drop the index i, i.e. A := A i whence 1 ≤ i ≤ N . At the same time the values of all agents different from i are kept fix, i.e. f (s, i) := f i ′ (s, i), with the notation introduced above. Real valued functions on X = {1, . . . , k} can be represented as k-vectors and consequenly the generator A as a k × k-matrix. We assume that A is a time inhomogeneous Q-matrix on X, i.e.
•
Thus we have ν i (s, ρ s ) := ν i (s, i, ρ s ) = − i =j ν j (s, i, ρ s ) since the row sum vanishes. We find using matrix form
Since A is a finite dimensional matrix valued function of time we have the following: The solution to the Kolmogorov equation given by the matrix (2.1) possesses the cocycle property, which replaces the semi group property of autonomous systems see [28] , [3] . Intimately related to the cocycle property is the notion of a propagator to be found e.g. in physics publications or in works of Reed and Simon respectively V. Kolokoltsov. A family of mappings U t,s , t ≤ s ≤ T , in a set S is called a (forward) propagator (resp. backward propagator) in S if U t,t = id S and the following iteration equation holds:
Here U t,s U s,r is to be interpreted as the iteration of mappings. For linear propagators or evolutions it means the application of linear operators, see [2] and [7] .
Remark 2.2. The matrix valued functions Λ(s, r, ·) constitute bounded linear operators. The family {Λ(t, s, ·) | 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T } generated by the operator A defines a positive, strongly continuous linear propagator or evolution on the set of Euclidean k-vectors which trivially coincides with the set of (continuous) real valued functions on the discrete set X.
We now recall the connection between linear propagators or evolutions and nonautonomous Markov processes which we intend to use for solving the control problem. We adopt the notation in [2] to the time dependent case.
Let (E, E) be a measurable space and U t,r an arbitrary linear propagator. Assume that x ∈ E, E ∈ E. We say that {p(t, x, r, E) := (U t,r χ E ), where 0 ≤ t ≤ r < ∞} and χ E is the indicator function of the set, is a normal transition family if
(1) the maps x → p(t, x, r, E) are measurable for each E ∈ E; (2) the Chapman Kolmogorov equation holds; (3) p(t, x, r, ·) is a probability measure E. For the finite measurable space (X, P(X)) measurability in x is trivially satisfied and the cocycle property together with the existence of a kernel reveal the Chapman Kolmogorov equation. The Markov property follows from the following proposition which is a straight forward adaption from [26] .
We thus have:
Lemma 2.4. The family Λ generated by the matrix valued function Au is a normal transition family.
As done in [16] the notion of a projective family for time inhomogeneous transition probabilities see [2] Theorem 3.1.7 holds for general measurable spaces (E, E) and trivially also to finite sets X, and arbitrary probability measures µ in X. The existence of a process is then guaranteed by the Kolmogorov existence theorem. We only state the existence of a process in the following Proposition 2.5. Given a normal transition family {p t,r (x, K), 0 ≤ t ≤ r < ∞} and a fixed probability measure µ on the finite measurable space (X, P(X)), then there exists a probability space (Ω, F, IP µ ), a filtration (F t , t ≥ 0) and a Markov process (X t , t ≥ 0) on that space such that:
Since X is compact the proof follows the line of arguments in Ethier Kurtz Theorem and [2] Theorem 3.1.7. The result holds in general for Polish spaces. In Section 5 we shall see that the solution of the kinetic equation (3.2) is the limit of the linear N -mean field evolutions as N tends to infinity which arises when restricting the generator A in (1.1) to C sym (X N ) and replacing the parameter ρ by the empirical distribution. The corresponding adjoint is denoted by A * N . In order to prove the mean field limit we need to unify spaces. This is possible since the factor spaces SX and the spaces of N -point measures P N δ (X) on the one hand as well as the corresponding larger spaces M(X) and IR k on the other hand can be identified. We consider existence and uniqueness and the sensitivity analysis of the solutions of the Kolmogorov equation and the optimal control problems for the N -player on the larger space IR k .
Consequently we replace or identify in a first step A * N with the linear operator
The operator reads in more detail:
is the transpose of the matrix ν δ ℓ (t, δ ℓ ′ , u) and n ℓ describes how often the value l appears and n ℓ ′ is specified by the kernel ν.
In a second step, specific to the case of a finite set X, we identify {δ 1 , . . . , δ k } with the standard basis {e 1 , . . . , e k } in IR k to find that x ∈ SX with |x| = N corresponds to x N = k ℓ=1 n ℓ e ℓ ∈ IR k with k ℓ=1 n ℓ = N and:
n ℓ e ℓ .
Hypothesis B
For the rest of the paper we complement the assumptions made on the domains of the variables and parameters of operator A by regularity conditions, namely: We assume that ν is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in the parameter x ∈ IR k , and continuous in t. Moreover, the partial derivatives ∇ x ν(t, i, x) are assumed to exist in C ∞ (R k ) as functions of x and to be uniformly Lipschitz continuous, uniformly in the other variables. Finally let the cost function J(s, i, x, u), 0 ≤ t < s ≤ T , to the control problems in Section 4 be quadratic concave in u and satisfy the same properties as ν regarding s, i, x with s replacing t.
In the sequel we give an alternative representation of the linear operatorÂ N t . For practical reasons we introduce a scaling parameter h ∈ R + . For differentiable functions F on M(X) a variational derivative 
, and h ∈ R + , has the representation:
Due to the fact that the agents are indistinguishable the sum with respect to ℓ becomes a factor N.
Proof. For Y and Y + ζ such that the whole line {Y + θζ | 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1} is in M ⊂ IR k and F ∈ C 2 (M ) the Taylor theorem gives the following representation, see [25] 
Inserting the Taylor expansion of order 2 into (2.4) under the integral for the choice Y = hx N and ζ = h((e ℓ + e ℓ ′ ) − e ℓ ) finishes the proof. We gladly anticipate that the first term coincides with the generator of the Koopman propagator constructed in Proposition (3.4) for the choice h = 
Properties of the Non linear Evolution
In the sequel we investigate the nonlinear Kinetic equation which was motivated by the weak equation (1.1), namelẏ
1) 0 < t < T . For the finite set X the set of real valued functions on X, the set of bounded measurable and and the set of bounded continuous functions C ∞ (X) coincide and are isomorphic to IR k . Consequently the dual space, the space of bounded measures M(X), is isomorphic to IR k . When identifying M(X) and IR k the Kinetic equation, is the following nonlinear differential equation in IR k :
2) 0 < t < T . Under the conditions of Hypothesis A the subsequent theorem gives the existence of a corresponding flow which is continuously differentiable in all variables, parameters and initial conditions. Proposition 3.1. Let M be a subset in B 1 (0) ⊂ IR k and U ⊂ IR k a convex bounded open control set. Assume that the matrix valued function A * (s, x) in ( 2.1) is continuous in t > t 0 for some t 0 ∈ IR and of type C q , for q ≥ 1, in the variable x ∈ M . Then so is the unique nonlinear global flow α(t 0 , t, x 0 , u), t 0 ≤ t, arising from the solution of the Kinetic equation above. The unique global flow is defined on the whole space IR k .
Since ν is bounded and the set of admissible controls U ⊂ IR k is bounded, the vector valued function ν(s, x)ux satisfies a uniform Lipschitz condition on 
where |·| is the Euclidean norm in IR k .
We summarize our findings by concluding that the initial value problem (3.2) is well-posed.
Definition 3.3. Let β(t, s), 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T, be a nonsingular flow in a set K of a given Banach space, then
defines a linear operator on C(K) which we call the Koopman propagator with respect to β(t, s).
The notion coincides with the Koopman operator in [23] . From the general theory, see [23] , it follows that the Koopman propagator has the following properties:
• Φ t,s is a linear propagator.
where · denotes the norm in the Banach space. Being a contraction the Koopman propagator is bounded. For M as in Proposition 3.1 we introduce the set C 1 (M ) of functionals F = F (x) such that the gradient ∇ x F is continuous. This space becomes a Banach space when equipped with the norm i) The time inhomogeneous global flow α corresponding to the solution x s , 0 ≤ t < s ≤ T of the kinetic equation defines the time inhomogeneous Koopman propagator:
ii) The generator of the Koopman propagator is defined by 
where x = x t and 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T . For F ∈ C 1 (M ) with compact support the mean value theorem reveals
where t ≤ θ ≤ s. Since the derivatives F xi have compact support by introducing the flow α(t, s, x t ) given by the solution x s into the kinetic equation (3.2) with x t = x we obtain for t ≤ θ ≤ s:
uniformly ∀x ∈ M and ∀F ∈ C 1 (M ) thus (3.7) has a strong limit in C 1 (M ) and the infinitesimal generator A is giving by
iii) To show the strong continuity we insert the definition of the Koopman propagator and exploit the properties of the flow given by Proposition 3.1, i.e.we have:
for every F ∈ C 1 (M ). The fact that the set of continuously differentiable functions with compact support form a dense subset of C 1 (M ) concludes the proof.
Controlled Jump Markov Process
In this subsection we shall describe the principle of dynamic programming and the corresponding HJB equation for the finite state Markov Jump Processes corresponding to the N -mean field dynamics and the Koopman propagator. Two types of control problems with game theoretic applications will be covered: One simplified preliminary cost function J which does not depend on an individual player but on the dynamics associated with the N -mean-field respectively Koopman propagator only. The other case where an individual player is introduced whose dynamics is given by the operator A and who is subject to the N -mean-field respectively mean field and both appear as measure valued parameters y respectively y N in the cost function. In the first case the cost function J :
where V ′ T (X N T ) describes a terminal cost and X N is the Markov process generated byÂ N in (2.4). In the second case the optimal payoff for one player is represented by the value function
starting at time t and position j. The process X 1 with generator A[s, j, y s ] is associated with the dynamics of the player. The measure valued parameter y is replaced by the mean field respectively the N -mean field in the end. In the latter case we use the notation V N for the value function. In order to guarantee a unique optimal control law in the set of Lipschitz continuous functions of the solutions, we confine to quadratic cost functions
for J j,ℓ ∈ IR + and s ∈ [0, T ], j ∈ X, y ∈ M, u ∈ U see [29] . We emphasize that the assumptions of Hypotheses A and B hold even for this section. The methodology in a standard setting reveals the HJB equation i.e. the following system of ordinary differential equations 
∂A[t, y] ∂y
• J(t, y) is C 1 −differentiable with respect to the vector y, also there exists a constant c 2 such that: for all terminal data V T ∈ R k and the solution V t is of class C 1 in the parameters y and u for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Suppose that J j,ℓ (s, α, y) is C 1 -differentiable with respect to the additional parameter α ∈ IR, then the solution V t is C 1 -differentiable with respect to the parameters y, u, and α.
The result is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.1.
In order to cover the control problem (4.1) we need to generalize Corollary 4.2 in such a way that the parameter y is replaced by a curve y. We study smooth dependence of the solution of the HJB equation (4.4) above when replacing the parameter y ∈ IR k by a curve y = y(t), t ∈ [0, T ], in IR k , i.e.
Let us introduce a curve y in the form of a piece of a straight line into the value function. For any (t, j) ∈ [0, T ] × X and y 1 , y 2 ∈ C([0, T ], M ) we define:
Hence the smooth dependence on the solutions of the HJB equation on the functional vector valued parameter y reduces to dependence on the real parameter α.
If the directional derivative ∂ y 2 −y 1 V of V (t, j, y) exists and is continuous we have:
We adopt the assumptions we made when we studied smooth dependence on the real parameter y. ( 4.7) is Lipschitz continuous in y uniformly, i.e. for y 1 ,
For measure valued functions y ∈ M([0, T ]) the Euklidean k-norm on the right hand side can be replaced by a weak*-norm, namely:
where
The first result follows from Proposition 3.1 where the parameter y is chosen from the Banach space of continuous functions with the supremum norm. The second result follows since the norm is weaker. We point out that C 2 is dense in C. An analogous result holds for the value function V associated with the Koopman dynamics. Moreover, there exists a unique optimal Feedback control lawû to the value function V in (4.1).
Proposition 4.4. Under Hypotheses A and B, given a final payoff V
′T the optimal controlû defined by the cost function (4.1), is of feedback formû = Γ(t, ·) and is Lipschitz continuous i.e, for any η, The line of arguments and results presented above for the control problem with value function V carries over to the modifications considered in this paper. We shall not repeat it.
Convergence of N-particle Approximations
In Physics and Biology scaling limits and analyzing scaling limits are well established techniques which allow to focus on particular aspects of the system under consideration. Scaling empirical measures by a small parameter h in such a way that the measure h(δ x1 + . . . + δ xN ) remains finite when the number N of particles or species tends to infinity and the individual contribution becomes negligible allows to treat the ensemble as continuously distributed. Scaling k th -order interactions by h k−1 reflects the idea that they are more rare than k−ℓ order ones for 1 ≤ ℓ < k and makes them neither negligible nor overwhelming. This scaling transforms an arbitrary generator Λ k of a k th -order interaction into
with positive kernel P (x xI ; dy). The N -mean field limit is a law of large numbers for the first order interactions given by the N -mean field evolutions. For the special case of pure jump type N -mean field evolutions, cf. (1.2), we prove weak convergence to the solution of the kinetic equation (3.2) by exploiting properties of the corresponding propagators. The procedure consists of introducing the scale h = 1 N and as explained in Section 3 by unifying space, i.e. it is pursued by substituting f (x) by F ( 1 |x| δ x ) where |x| denotes the length of the vector. In this section we adopt the representation on IR k which was introduced in (2.4).The property exploited in the construction proving the N -mean field limit is: ≤ C 1 , i = 1, 2, such that for any f ∈ R k the equation
The result is adopted from a well known result on bounded linear operators see e.g. [10] , and [18] . The representation is used to derive the subsequent properties. The propagator Λ(t, s, ·) generated by the operator A * in (2.1) is bounded.
As in Section 3 let ψ 
2 (M ) and the flow α as in Proposition 3.1, independent of the control parameter u ∈ U . We continue by estimating
for 0 ≤ t ≤ r ≤ s ≤ T, and Proposition 2.6 was applied in the last step. The Sobolev type norm F C 2 (M) combines the supremum norm of F and its second derivative. The constant C(T ) summarizing the three operator norms and integration with respect to time. This estimate will in a further step be applied to estimate the order of convergence in the mean field limit. The initial values are chosen to suit the operators and hence differ while N changes. In fact, we shall assume that the initial conditions In the next section we shall assume that all agents are following a common strategy γ(t, j) but one player, for instance the first one, who applies a different control u 1,t =γ(t, j).
Mean field limits as an ǫ-Nash equilibrium
A strategy portfolio Γ in a game of N agents with payoffs V i (Γ), i = 1, ..., N, is called an ǫ-Nash equilibrium if, for each player i and an acceptable individual strategy
where (Γ −i , u i ) denotes the profile obtained from Γ by substituting the strategy of player i with u i . Consequently we present two couples, consisting of a family of N-mean field games, where one player has a different preference than all others, and a game with the corresponding Koopman dynamics. For the sake of a shorter notation we use again x n := 1 N k ℓ η ℓ e ℓ . In the first model the N -mean field acts as a single player and the differing preferenceγ is part of it and in the second model this player is kept separate. In the first setting the dynamics of N interacting agents will be generated by the following operator 
with a constant C(T ) independent onγ. 
Since the operator A * is bounded and more regular in the parameters than A, the propagator φ 0,t γ,γ inherits the properties of the Koopman propagator φ 0,t . Here we mention in particular that φ 0,t γ,γ is a strongly continuous contraction. By inserting (6.1) into the definition and by applying Proposition 2.6 we find:
For the Kolmogorov equation corresponding to this generator we make the assumptions on the initial conditions that x 
is the Markov process specified by the propagator ξ We estimate the first term by (5.3) using the operator norm and the second and the third ones by using the assumptions (6.5) and (5.5) respectively. This finishes the proof of part i).
ii) Let us represent both integrals The results of this and the previous two sections, and Theorem 6.5 in particular are based on a fixed control parameter, depending on time however, and thus hold independently on the MFG methodology. Theorem 6.6. Let {A[t, j, y, u] | t ≥ 0, j ∈ X, y ∈ M, u ∈ U} be the family of jump type operators given in ( 2.1) and x be the solution to equation ( 3.2) . Assume the following i) The kernel ν(t, j, y, u t ) satisfies the Hypotheses A and B;
ii) The time-dependent Hamiltonian H t is of the form ( 4.8);
iii) The terminal function V T is in C γ,T ) . For the proof the difference is rewritten such that the estimates in Theorems 6.2 and 6.5 can be applied taking into account the regularization mentioned above. We find
where J is the supremum norm in the components. It is clear that these estimates hold if we start the game at any time t ∈ [0, T ]. This completes the proof and the construction of the mean-field game in this paper.
